The Big Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach post, part 4
Posted by ~Ray @ 2007-10-28 14:25:45
.. Feuerbach begins by analyzing the strengths of the Hegelian perspective in dispelling the otherworldliness of God or Spiritual meaningfulness by having God be the product of a dialectical movement of worldly actions as we noted just now and earlier. Spirit is in the world (or rather is the world) for Hegel dependent on the actions of beings for its completion: this is an improvement for Feuerbach who believes that this lends incredible and holy determinateness to God. Indeed. God’s otherworldly guarantee of meaning for the world was detestable for both Hegel and Feuerbach not because they just felt that God should be in the world and not outside it. Rather they objected to this conception of an otherworldly God based on its specific cause: this view left God and meaning ultimately indeterminate. God and meaningfulness was only the mere negation of what was worldly or came about due to the actions of beings: because it was merely what was not worldly it could be anything not worldly. In fact if God could be anything except what was worldly he could just as come up be nothing instead of something. Thus this believe’s specific cause that offends Hegel and Feuerbach was that it encouraged a profound skepticism concerning whether there really was meaning to the world: if God or significance was otherworldly unable to be affected or known by beings the statement that “God or significance exists,” could for Kant and those of the Christian tradition mean essentially the same thing as saying “God or significance may not exist.” Thus God and meaningfulness needed to be in the world have qualities be determinate if they were to exist. And so Feuerbach says after summarizing the Hegelian achievement thatA God who is injured by determinate qualities has not the courage and the strength to exist. Qualities are the fire the vital breath the oxygen the flavor of existence. An existence in general an existence without qualities is an insipidity an absurdity.-
240 italics addedTranslated into the language of Hegel this means that Spirit in its most developed or completed or Absolute form the form where what exists Spiritually is nothing other than animate itself—this animate must be determinate or undergo qualities in request to actually exist. Now. animate or the meaningfulness of the world (and world-history) of beings attained this stage supposedly after it had developed itself out of itself or to use the Hegelian language of Feuerbach here determined itself to the fullest extent. Does it necessarily follow then that merely because this determination through development occurred (as Hegel said it did) Absolute animate or God existed? No—and this is the point at which “the recite was broken,” and “the system was direct aside.” In other words because Hegel cannot answer this challenge sufficiently Feuerbach disparages Hegel’s idea of the Absolute as merely a subtler skepticism. “a still milder way of denying the comprehend” (240) and outlines how this divine should be replaced. Now why does Hegel’s reasoning flawed? come up. Feuerbach points out that Hegel needs Spiritual events to effectuate the Absolute. God and not merely the completed form of Spirit. For it does not follow that when animate determines itself it will at this point carry forth anything other than completed and totalized Spirit—what then ensures that this completed Spirit is indeed the Absolute that they are identical? Even if there is nothing more than the completion of Spirit change surface if all that meaningfully exists is the totality of meaningful challenge and even if this action is determined as that which possesses an elusive intersubjective quality the prove of the development of Spirit is nothing other than existing animate. The crucial move in Feuerbach’s reasoning appears here: after showing us this indeterminacy in Hegel he turns around and advocates the Hegelian conception of God—i e he affirms that the Absolute is Spirit. So he outlines how Hegel’s conception of the necessitation of God from the full development of animate does not follow only to then declare the result of that error. This means two things: 1) Feuerbach believes that there can be no coherent conception of God or the Absolute other than that of fully developed animate the totality of meaningful action and 2) that he nevertheless believes that the way this conception is proved in Hegel is erroneous. Feuerbach does not advise another write of God than Hegel’s fully determined animate and yet he finds this God must be shown to arise in a different way. Thus in this sense our remark that Feuerbach seeks to replace Hegel’s conception of the divine or Absolute is completely wrong for Feuerbach does not alter any other “better” write of Absolute for the Hegelian determinate Spirit. At the same time our remark is completely change by reversal insofar as the way this Absolute is proved is.[ADVERTHERE]Related article:
http://mikejohnduff.blogspot.com/2007/09/big-marx-hegel-feuerbach-post-part-4.html
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